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Augustinian picture of how we learn language §
Wittgenstein opens PI Augustine’s picture:
Common sense description: words name objects, sentences are combinations of
such names
Every word has a correlated meaning which is the object for which the word
stands.
Problem: what object does the word ‘and’ stand for?
Is Philosophical Investigations criticizing this picture? §
Standard thought is this picture is the main object of criticism of PI
Gustafsson thinks this is making too much philosophy out of the Augustinian
(in fact, Augstine himself doesn’t subscribe to the philosophical
implications commonly attributed to the passage)
This simple picture is attractive and can be applied in good ways or bad ways.
Pictures for Wittgenstein operate on a primative level, can’t say they’re
right or wrong.
Wittgenstein in Foundations of Mathematics : “We don’t judge the picture
but we judge by means of the picture.”
They are prototheories / paradigms that are bad if cut from their useful
applications.
e.g. Start looking for the correlate of the word red, postulate Platonic
forms and get philosophical confusion
Cannot be argued against because counterexamples can be absorbed by a
picture, which can be elaborated upon
The closer the picture is to a fully fleshed out theory, the harder (more
artificial-seeming) this becomes.
Is Wittgenstein criticizing Plato? §
If Wittgenstein is not strictly criticizing Augustine, is he at least
criticizing Plato ?
Wittgenstein quotes Theatetus picture of language: Socrates is presenting
something he has heard and he concludes we don’t really understand it.
Wittgenstein considers himself in a common struggle with Plato and
Augustine. He is attracted by these pictures but is trying to overcome them,
just like Plato and Augustine.
If Wittgenstein is documenting his personal struggles, then what
philosophical value is there? Is it just of autobiographical interest?
There are many levels of PI - he provides arguments and uncovers
paradoxes.
Is he merely providing more details to the pictures in order to try to
avoid the counterexamples/paradoxes? Is he trying to get rid of pictures
altogether? Experts are divided.
Some say ‘meaning as use’ is a picture, one he thinks is less harmful
than augustinian view
He doesn’t really want to construct theories, but rather wants
philosophical peace / quietism.
More potentially harmful pictures §
thinking as something that goes on inside your head
regarding infinity as merely something very large
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