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Two notions of good §
Distinction: good (absolutely) vs good for something vs good
E.g. It’s good to be kind, it’s good for me to study math, that’s a good car
British 20th centurary moral philosophers like GE Moore don’t like “good for
X” wanting a morality that is not egoistic, instead trying to frame in terms
of absolute good.
These theories overlooked possible justifications which use “good for” but
are not egoistic.
Absolute good is a much more abstract / questionable concept, so it would be
nice to frame ethics without it if possible.
Is there bad §
These may be different (absolute good is incoherent, but not absolute bad)
but Kraut needs neither.
It’s coherent to say “pain is bad”, but we also say “it’s bad for me to
feel pain”. What more is gained by using absolute language?
What about cruelty/cowardice?
Again we can show that these things are bad because they are bad for
people.
Moral consequences §
Does this point of view lead to egoism, e.g. good/bad being instrumental to
what we want?
Mistake to conflate “good for me” as “what I want” or “good for some end I
want”.
There are objective truths of what is good for certain types of beings, even
if we’re ignorant.
There are differences and similarities for what is good for different
people/species.
Cannot apply same formula to each case.
Issues §
What problems does thinking about morality in terms of absolute good have?
It’s not necessarily bad. But it could be used to justify something that is
bad for everybody.
Practical applications §
Euthenasia §
Argument against euthansisa: life itself is good (would not be sufficient if
Kraut’s thesis is accepted)
Conflicting interests §
E.g. good for A to be loud, good for B to be in quiet environment
We should organize political institutions to avoid needless conflict.
The concept of justice is needed to resolve these cases.
“Absolute Good” not needed
My response at the time §
We can frame some instances of absolute good/bad in terms of good for, but the
interesting question is can this be done for all uses?
if absolute bad exists, then it does seem possible that an institituion /
relationship is good for everyone involved but still is bad (or vice
versa). E.g. euthansia.
Kraut’s grammar of moral terms should not alter this fact.
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