Original argument appearing in Chapters II and III of Appearance and reality - A metaphysical essay.
- Bradley notes that there appears to be such a thing as ‘a lump of sugar’, and
this thing appears to have qualities such as whiteness, sweetness, and
hardness.
- But what is this “thing” that bears properties?
- On the one hand, it’s odd to assume that there is something to the lump of
sugar beside its several qualities
- So, postulating a property-less bearer of properties is incoherent.
- On the other hand, he notes that the lump cannot merely be its qualities either, since the latter must somehow be united.
- On the one hand, it’s odd to assume that there is something to the lump of
sugar beside its several qualities
- But what is this “thing” that bears properties?
- For Bradley, unity or “coexistence” of qualities presupposes relations.
- But the ontology of relations is prone to the following infinite regress:
- We postulate the relation that relates properties and
- We then need a relation to relate to (and to ).