Observed by Sellars to be responsible for a lot of philosophical confusion.
Most interesting philosophical concepts come with a “-ing”/ “-ed” distinction that’s crucial to understand the nature of.
Do you mean the describing or the describable when you say “description”?
We need to distinguish the fact and the content.
The Agrippan trilemma can be thought of as caused by conflating act of justifying vs the state of being justified.
Is an experience an act of act of experiencing vs what’s experienced. Sellars thinks Berkeley was confused by this.
‘Representation’ is the relation between two relata: the representings and the representeds. Making this distinction helps avoid the Cartesian trap of thinking of the fact of as being a representing (e.g. a thought about something) being an ontological fact (i.e. a statement about the true nature of ) rather than a fact of how relates to other things (it could be represented in one context and a representing in another).
Facts are true thinkables. There were facts before there were any thinkables. (confusing this leads to “there is nothing outside the text”)
- You can’t be inside the rules and outside talking about them at the same time.